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COMMENT

ADAPTING DUE PROCESS TO MATCH
YOUR TORT: IN RE DES: A NOVEL
APPROACH TO JURISDICTION
Prior to the adjudication of an issue, a court must inquire into
its jurisdiction,1 for without jurisdiction, a court's holding is not
binding.2 Before a court can decide a case, it must have jurisdic1 See Arrowsmith v. United Press Intl., 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc)
("Not only does logic compel initial consideration of the issue ofjurisdiction over the
defendant-a court without such jurisdiction lacks power.. . ."). In Arrowsmith, the
Maryland resident plaintiff brought a libel action in the federal district court in Vermont concerning a story which originated in Atlanta. Id. at 220-21. The defendant
moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
Id. The judge sustained the last, but did not rule on the other two motions. Id. at 221.
On appeal, Judge Friendly held that the issue of personal jurisdiction must be decided
first, and the venue issue second. Id. Judge Friendly reasoned that "dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or improper venue does not preclude a subsequent action in an appropriate forum, whereas dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is with prejudice." Id.
2 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,732-33 (1877) (stating that judgments lacking
jurisdiction are not binding). In Pennoyer, Neffs property had been attached after a
default judgment was entered against him. However, Neff was never personally
served; he was only given notice by publication. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CrVM PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 97 (2d ed. 1993). Neff sued Pennoyer in ejectment, arguing
that there was no personal jurisdiction in the original action. Id. at 97-98. Justice
Field stated that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons
or property without its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. "[E]xcept as restrained
and limited by [the Constitution], [states] possess and exercise the authority of independent States.. . ." Id. After Pennoyer,a state court could obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if (1) the defendant was personally served
within the state or voluntarily appeared in court or (2) the defendant owned property
within the state which was attached before commencing the lawsuit. See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, at 98-99; see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (noting inability to make binding personal judgment against
corporate defendant without satisfying jurisdictional test). International Shoe Company was a Delaware corporation headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri. Id. at 311-12.
The company had no office in Washington; their "salesmen resided in Washington;
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tion over both the parties (personal jurisdiction) and the subject
matter. Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
personal jurisdiction in federal courts,4 extending jurisdiction
within the territorial boundaries of the state in which the district
court is located, as well as anywhere service is amenable under

[the salesmen's] principal activities were confined to that state; and they were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of their sales." Id. at 313. The salesmen had limited authority to make decisions, as the headquarters fixed the shoe
prices and all goods were "shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington .... " Id. at
314. International Shoe claimed that these activities did not constitute a presence
within Washington and that they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in that
state's courts. Id. at 315. The Supreme Court held that a defendant only needs "minimum contacts with [the forum state) such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,'" and that such contacts
existed in that case. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
3 There are two categories of subject matter jurisdiction which will permit a federal court to hear a case. The first is the existence of a federal question. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. The second type of
subject matter jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in
controversy must exceed $50,000, and the parties to the action must be citizens of
different states or of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Article HI, section 2 of the
Constitution limits the ability of federal statutes to define permissible subject matter
in federal courts. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.2, at 10-12. Within those
limits, Congress may expand or limit the subject matter which a federal court may
hear. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F.
Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973) ("When it comes to jurisdiction of the federal courts, truly,
to paraphrase the scripture, the Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.").
States develop their own rules with respect to subject matter jurisdiction. See
FRMDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.1, at 9-10.
A court must also have jurisdiction over the parties to a lawsuit. See FED. R. CIrv.
P. 4 (prescribing permissible methods of serving defendants). The Constitution provides the "outer limits" of a state's power over non-residents of the state. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.... ."); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET. AL., supra note 2, § 3.1, at 94 ("The
federal Constitution ... defines the outermost limits of a state's power over persons
... outside its borders, [and the state may impose] any additional limitations [beyond
those in the Constitution] . .. ."); Maryellen Fullerton, ConstitutionalLimits on Nationwide PersonalJurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 3, 4 (1984)
(arguing that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require courts to determine if location of lawsuit will be unfair to defendant).
4 Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1980) (recognizing that Congress has
power to expand choice of legal judicial district in which suit may be brought, but can
limit circumstances under which choice is available); see FED. R. Civ. P. 4. Rule Four
grants and explains the courts' power of service of process over potential defendants.
Id. See generally Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (acknowledging that Congress has ability to provide for service of process anywhere in
United States). But cf Fullerton, supra note 3, at 31-32 (observing that Constitution
protects defendants from litigation at distant locations).
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the state's long-arm provision.5 In addition, Rule 4 confers juris-6
diction in certain third-party actions under the "bulge provision"
and in any action expressly proscribed by statute.7 However, any
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
must satisfy the due process standards of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
The Supreme Court interpretation of due process for jurisdictional purposes has evolved from a strict test of physical presence9
to a liberal test based on "minimum contacts" and fairness.' ° A
5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). A long-arm statute permits the exercise of state court
jurisdiction over persons not physically present in the state at the time of service. As
Rule 4 states:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides... for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
service may... be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
Id. This provision allows a federal court sitting in the forum state to adopt the forum's long-arm statute as a basis for extraterritorial service. See David D. Siegel,
PracticeCommentaries,FED. R. Crv. P. 4, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 4, at 135-36 (West 1992).
For example, New York's long-arm statute, inter alia, allows service upon non-domiciliaries transacting business within the state, committing torts within the state, committing torts out of the state causing injury within New York, or owning property
within the state. See N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. L. & R. 302 (McKinney 1990).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). Rule 4(f) states:
[Plersons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14 [third party
defendants], or as additional parties to a pending action or a counterclaim or
cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19 [indispensable parties], may be
served ... at all places outside the state but within the United States that
are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced ....
Id.
7 Id. Jurisdiction is available "within the territorial limits of the state in which
the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by
these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state." Id.
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
9 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). According to the Court's earlier
test, jurisdiction could only be attained through defendant's voluntary appearance or
presence within the forum state. Id.
10 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A state
may not make a binding personal judgment against a defendant who has "no contacts,
ties, or relations" with the state. Id. at 319. In cases in which the defendant is a
corporation and suit is brought to enforce obligations that arise from the corporation's
activities within a state, the proceeding is considered fair and reasonable because the
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valid exercise of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause requires minimum contacts between the non-resident and the forum
state, as well as fairness and reason in requiring the defendant to
litigate in the forum at issue.'1 To establish minimum contacts,
"some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State" is necessary. 12 Recently, however, in Ashley v. Abbott Laboratoriesan re
Des),' 3 a mass tort diethylstilbestrol (DES) action, 4 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held
that a non-resident defendant corporation, lacking traditional
contacts, was within the jurisdictional grasp of the
minimum
15
forum.
corporation is enjoying the benefits and protection of state laws. Id.; see supra note 2
(discussing InternationalShoe).
11 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (New
York car dealer could not "reasonably anticipate being haled into court' in Oklahoma
by customers who drove their defective car from New York to Oklahoma); see also
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987) (plurality opinion) (mere awareness that tire valve assemblies would end up in forum state is not
sufficient purposeful conduct).
12 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957). The potential plaintiffs unilateral activity cannot satisfy the contact requirement with a non-resident defendant.
Id. "[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474 (1985) (quoting InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The purposeful availment test protects the defendant from being forced to litigate in the jurisdiction based
on "random, isolated, or fortultous" contacts. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (regular sales of thousands of magazines found to be sufficient
purposeful contact); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112 ("[Mlinimum
contacts must come about by 'an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State.'") (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476).
13 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
14 See Arthur H. Downey & Kenneth G. Gully, Theories of Recovery for DES Damage: Is Tort Liability the Answer?, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 167 (1983). DES is a synthetic
estrogen developed in the late 1930's by a group of British scientists. Id. at 168-72. In
the United States, DES manufacturers initially sought the Federal Drug Administration's ("FDA") approval of the drug for the treatment of, among other things, "post
menopausal symptoms." Payton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (D. Mass.
1981). The FDA approved the marketing of DES for non-pregnancy usage after a
group of twelve manufacturers formed the "Small Committee" in 1939 and gathered
enough relevant data on DES to gain approval. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79
A.D.2d 317, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), affd, 55 N.Y.2d 571 (1982). By 1947, the FDA
had approved the drug's use for the prevention of miscarriages on an experimental
basis. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). Since all of the manufacturers used the same chemical formula to produce
DES, it was ordinarily marketed as a generic drug. See Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 319-20.
15 See Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 572 ("Hymowitz and the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules as well as legislative policy must be read as favoring a jurisdictional
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In Ashley, the plaintiff class was comprised entirely of New
York residents.' 6 The defendant, Boyle & Co. ("Boyle"), was a California-based pharmaceutical corporation, which operated west of
the Mississippi River and was involved in the manufacture and
distribution of DES between 1949 and 1960.17 Boyle occupied less
than one-half of one percent of the DES market18 and never
shipped any products to New York. 19 Furthermore, Boyle was
never licensed to do business in New York, nor had any agents or
offices within the state.2 0 For purposes of determining jurisdiction under the New York long-arm statute, 2 ' the court found that,
absent any proof to the contrary, the "situs of the injury" must be

New York, where the plaintiffs' mothers probably had ingested
reach consistent with the national market share rationale and the adoption of several
liability.").
16 Id. at 559-60. Initially, New York residents comprised approximately half of
the plaintiff class; however, the class was later limited to only New York residents. Id.
By limiting the plaintiff class in this way, the court was able to apply both the substantive and jurisdictional law of New York. Id. at 576; see also Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816-17 (1985) (citing injustice of state court application of
own law despite insignificant contacts with each class member); Allstate Ins. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (stating choice-of-law is determined by significance of
state contacts); Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Law Problem
in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 131-40 (1989) (analyzing different
approaches to choice-of-law rules in mass tort litigation).
17 See Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 559.
Co-defendant Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Boehringer"), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut, moved with
Boyle to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. In 1979 Boehringer
merged with Stayner Corporation, a California company. Id. Stayner manufactured
and sold DES in west coast states between 1949 and 1956, with yearly DES sales that
averaged about $5,000 per year. Id. Stayner was never licensed in New York, never
had an agent or office in New York, and never shipped or sold DES in New York. Id.
18 Id. at 593. Boyle's share of the market never exceeded one half of one percent
in any one year. Id.
19 Id. at 559.
20

Id.

See N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. 302 (McKinney 1990). New York's long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personaljurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator,
who in person or through an agent:... (3) commits a tortious act without the
state causing injury to person or property within the state... if he... (ii)
expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce ....
21
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the DES. 22 In addition, the court concluded that any DES manufacturer should "'reasonably expect' its act to have . . . conse-

quences in [New York]," merely by participating in "the national
marketing of a generic drug .... -23 Finally, since Boyle had "received substantial revenue from commerce in several states," ju24
risdiction under the long-arm statute was established.
In deciding whether such an application of New York law satisfied the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, Judge Weinstein recognized that traditional due process analysis precludes
state assertions of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants having no physical, territorial nexus with the forum, that is, having
committed no voluntary act within the state. 25 Judge Weinstein
concluded, however, that "the territorial nexus requirement is, at
least in mass tort cases, an unnecessary and debilitating element
of the fairness inquiry."26 Through its interpretation of Hymowitz
22 See Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 570. In its choice-of-law analysis, the court stated
that the relevant last event of the tort occurred at ingestion of the DES or at birth,
both of which presumably took place in New York. Id. at 567. By analogy, the court
considered New York to be the presumed place of the tort. Id.
23 Id. at 572 (quoting N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1990)). According to Judge Weinstein, the defendants entered into the national market through
the marketing of a generic good which was protected by every state's law. Id. at 576.
Due to this national market participation, the court reasoned that each defendantmanufacturer "purposefully derive[d] benefit[s] from [its] interstate activities," and
therefore could not avoid the interstate obligations each had thus "voluntarily assumed." Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985)).
24 Id. at 570. The court found co-defendant Boehringer amenable to service under
section 301 of the CPLR, which incorporates the "consent" common law basis of jurisdiction. Id. at 569, 591. Since Boehringer was licensed to conduct business in New
York, it consented to being sued there. Id. at 569. According to the court, the lack of
contacts with New York by Boehringer's predecessor, Staymer, were immaterial to
Boehringer's jurisdictional arguments. Id. at 591.
25 See id. at 584-85; see also supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court cases which define constitutional limits of exercising personal jurisdiction over non-residents).
26 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 585. Judge Weinstein outlined the features of a mass
tort as follows:
(1) geographically widespread exposure to potentially harmful agents that
(2) affects a large or indeterminate number of plaintiffs, (3) possibly over
long time periods, even generations, (4)in different ways such that (5) there
is difficulty in establishing a general theory of causation and (6) an inability
to link a particular defendant's actions to a particular plaintiffs injuries, as
well as (7) difficulty in determining the number of potentially responsible
defendants and (8) in determining their relative culpability, if any, which
often results in (9) multiple litigations that burden the courts and cause
huge transactional costs, including heavy legal fees, and (10) which threatens the financial ability of many companies or ofwhole industries to respond
to traditional damage awards.

DES

1993]

v. Lilly & Co.,27 the seminal New York case apportioning liability
severally among DES manufacturers according to each manufacturer's market share, the district court determined that a "direct
link" was drawn between the "jurisdictional and substantive components of DES litigation" since a DES plaintiffs recovery under a
theory of several liability would be thwarted if all the manufacturers were not brought into court.2 The Ashley court reasoned that
since the substantive law of Hymowitz "empowers plaintiffs [in
mass tort DES cases] to bring in all industry participants to
achieve a full and economical resolution," jurisdictional law
should not prevent the "result[s] envisioned."2 9 Judge Weinstein
further found that prior precedent must not be a barrier to rational decision making. 30 Thus, the court fashioned a new due process test for mass DES torts, eliminating the territorial nexus requirement, yet preserving the fairness inquiry.3 1
This Comment examines the Ashley decision and suggests
that state substantive law should not be allowed to control "due
process" interpretation. First, it reviews prior case law on personal jurisdiction. It then explores the substantive DES law of
Hymowitz, in connection with the jurisdictional analysis of Ashley.
Finally, this Comment evaluates Judge Weinstein's "new" due
process test for mass DES torts, discussing the potential implications of inconsistent application of this standard by the courts.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court initially interpreted the Due Process
Clause very narrowly.32 In Pennoyer v. Neff,33 the Court questioned the validity of judgments over non-resident defendants absent their presence or consent and held that such jurisdictional
assertions are precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment. 34 ReId. at 562.

27 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
28 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 572.
29 Id. at 586.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 587 (outlining courts jurisdictional test for mass DES torts).

32 See Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that early interpretations "condoned all state procedural rules which were in conformity with 'settled
usage'" (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884))).
33 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

34 Id. at 733. "Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned,... [and] to
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garding corporations, presence was originally restricted to the
place of incorporation,"5 and later expanded to include principal
and other places of business.3 6 Attempting to create fair jurisdictional boundaries, the Court utilized the theories of implied consent, corporate presence,38 and domicile.3 9
The modern view of jurisdiction over foreign corporations,
however, derives mainly from InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,4 0 in which the Court established a due process standard,
based on the defendant's "minimum contacts" with the forum
state. 4 ' The minimum contacts must be judged by the "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,"42 and
the quality and nature of the defendant's activity must be deemed
reasonable to require defending a suit in the forum.43 In other
words, the exercise of jurisdiction must relate to the "fair and orderly administration of the laws," 44 and not offend traditional nopass upon the subject-matter of the suit;... [the defendant] must be brought [into the
State] by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance." Id.; see
also supra note 9 (discussing Pennoyer).
35 See Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497,
555 (1885) (explaining that corporation is capable of being treated as citizen for jurisdictional purposes because it is created by state and therefore deemed inhabitant); see
also Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 326-29 (1853) (stating
corporation is within state court's jurisdiction because it is created by state
legislature).
36 See Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68, 72 (1916) (doing business
sufficient to establish jurisdiction); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 266
(1917) (same); Berner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dryfus, 172 Mass. 154 (1898).
37 See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). In general, a corporation
cannot conduct business within a state unless it is granted approval. Id. Ordinarily,
in order to obtain this approval, a corporation must designate an agent for service of
process. Id. If a corporation fails to appoint an agent, yet conducts business within a
state, there is nevertheless jurisdiction based upon the corporation's "implied consent." Id.
38 Philadelphia & Reading Railway v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917). A foreign
corporation is amenable to service of process, absent consent, "only if it is doing business within the State in such [a] manner... as to warrant the inference that it is
present there." Id. at 265.
39 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (holding that domicile in state provides basis for court jurisdiction).
40 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41 Id. at 316.
42 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (noting proper focus ofjudging minimum contacts
determination is on defendant, forum, and litigation).
43 InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 317-19.
44 Id. at 319.
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tions of "fair play and substantial justice."4 5 Although Interna46 it still
tional Shoe expanded the basis for jurisdiction,
maintained a certain physical nexus requirement between the forum and defendant. 7
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,48 the Supreme
Court elaborated on the fairness requirement and set forth five
interests which should govern such an inquiry: the burden on the
defendant to litigate in the forum; 49 the interest of the interstate
judicial system in resolution of the action; 50 the interest of the fo-

rum state in the litigation; 51 the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
"convenient and effective" results;5" and the shared interests of
the states in promoting substantive social policies.5 3

IR. THE DES DILEMMA
A

New York Substantive DES Law

Modem jurisdictional standards have developed based on
traditional tort actions and other small-scale litigation. 54 Not surprisingly, mass torts and complex litigation present additional
45 Id. at 320 (indicating casual or "irregular" presence in forum not enough to
subject corporation to suit).
46 Cf Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (International
Shoe liberalized "the requirement of minimum contacts... without liberating" it.).
47 InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
48 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
49 Id. at 292 (stating burden on defendant is always primary concern, but may be
considered differently in light of other interests in certain circumstances).
50 Id.; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984).
51 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that state had "manifest interest" in residents'
claims against out of state insurance company which refused to pay).
52 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
53 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93, 98.
54 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 584-85. The Supreme Court has never articulated the
two-step jurisdictional due process test in the area of mass torts involving nationwide
product marketing. Id. at 585. The Court has only addressed this type of situation
once before in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), in which the
Court displayed a willingness to expand existing jurisdictional standards in the mass
tort context. Id. In Shutts, the applicable class action statute authorized joinder of
plaintiffs with an "opt-out" provision. Id. at 803. While the opt-out provision provided
detailed notice to all potential class members, it allowed the joinder of each member
who did not return the "request for exclusion." Id. at 801. In upholding the constitutionality of the provision, the court employed an implied consent theory. Id. at 811-14.
The Court, however, stressed that its holding applied only to class-action plaintiffs.
Id. at 808-11.
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problems and concerns, as evinced by nationwide recognition of
the DES problem. 5
In Hymowitz v. Lilly & Co.,5 6 the New York Court of Appeals
was faced with the issue of how to apportion liability among manufacturers of DES in cases in which the identification of the particular manufacturer whose product caused plaintiffs' injuries was
"generally impossible."5 7 After rejecting several methods, the
court established a "new" market theory approach,5 8 which gives
plaintiffs the ability to recover damages caused by DES without
specifically identifying the defendant that manufactured the drug
which caused the injury.5 9 This approach allocates liability severally based upon each defendant's share of the national market for
55 See Laura A. Abrams, Comment, The DES Dilemma: A Study in How Hard
Cases Make Bad Law, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 502 (1990) (describing failure of traditional tort principles in DES actions); see also Francis E. McGovern, Management of
Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case Management,
19 FORUM 1, 5-17 (1983) (noting discrepancies in various procedural devices used);
Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or
New Role for FederalCommon Law?, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 167, 203-08 (1985) (proposing federal common law that would provide fair adjudication of mass torts); Jack B.
Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 121-42 (1986) (exploring procedural tools and approaches utilized in
multi-jurisdictional disasters); Andrew C. Rose, Comment, FederalMass Tort Class
Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALA L. REV. 1180, 1183-84 (1983)
(discussing judicial reluctance to employ class action device in mass tort litigation).
56 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
57 Id. at 1072. The reasons for this type of identification problem in DES cases
are numerous. Id. Approximately 300 manufacturers produced the drug, with companies frequently entering and leaving the market. Id. All DES was made from identical chemical components, and due to the long latency period of injury from DES, women who took the drug did not try to identify the manufacturers until many years
after ingestion. Id. During this period, "memories fade, records are lost or destroyed,
and witnesses die." Id.
58 Id. at 1073-78. Declining to adopt a theory of concerted action, the court stated
that "parallel activity, without more, is insufficient to establish the agreement element necessary to maintain a concerted action claim." Id. at 1074. But see Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 186 (N.Y. 1989), in which the New York Court of
Appeals applied the concerted action theory of liability. The Hymowitz court looked to
decisions of the highest courts of three states in structuring their market share approach to recovery. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1076-78. Although the New York Court
of Appeals incorporated ideas from the other states in their approach, the standard
adopted most closely resembled the one set forth by the California Supreme Court. Id.
Under the California standard, a manufacturer's liability is deemed to be several. See
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 486 (Cal. 1988). Therefore, if a plaintiff does
not join all manufacturers with a substantial share of the DES market, the plaintiff
would not be entitled to a full recovery. Id.
59 See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075-78 (stating that DES litigation is unique
and singular scenario which justifies burdening each DES producer even if precise
manufacturer unknown). The Hymowitz court further explained:
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DES at the time of exposure,60 thus approximating the amount of
risk each defendant created for the public at large. 61 Each defendant is absolutely liable for its market share unless it can prove it
never manufactured the DES for use during pregnancy.6 2 Therefore, causation is not a required element of the "new" market
share analysis, and in its absence, defendants are not exculpated
from liability.6 3 By adopting this "new" market share approach,
while imposing only several liability, the Hymowitz court devel-

oped "an equitable way to provide plaintiffs with relief they deserve while also rationally distributing the responsibility for the
plaintiffs' injuries among the defendants."6 4

We are confronted here with an unprecedented identification problem, and
have provided a solution that rationally apportions liability. We have
heeded the practical lessons learned by other jurisdictions, resulting in our
adoption of a national market theory with full knowledge that it concedes
the lack of a logical link between liability and causation in a single case.
Id. at 1078 n.3.
60 Id. at 1077-78. (observing that national market adopted for practical reasons
despite resulting disproportion between liability and injury); see also Paul D. Rheingold, The Hymowitz Decision-PracticalAspects of New York DES Litigation, 55
BROOm L. Rv. 883, 893 (1989) (citing appellate attorney in Hymowitz who contended
that choice of national market, as opposed to New York market, was based on statement that all counsel favored such market).
61 Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1077-78. The court concluded that "[uinder the circumstances, this is an equitable way to provide plaintiffs with the relief they deserve,
while also rationally distributing the responsibility for plaintiffs' injuries among defendants." Id. at 1078.
62 See id. (explaining that liability is based on "risks created," rather than potential cause of injury); see also Abrams, supra note 55, at 511 (stating that Hymowitz
goes beyond absolute liability by holding manufacturers liable even if they were not
cause of injury).
63 See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078. "It is merely a windfall for a producer to
escape liability solely because it manufactured a more identifiable pill.... These fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of a defendant for marketing the product,
which is the basis of liability here." Id.; see also Abrams, supra note 55, at 507-08
(asserting that Hymowitz clearly departed from previous market share analysis by
applying liability based on overall risk created without allowing defendants to exonerate themselves); Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share-aTale of Two Centuries, 55 BROOFc
L. REv. 869, 873 (1989) (stating that causation and exculpation are incongruous).
'That Hymowitz has refused to play this charade (to potential causation in a market
share analysis by allowing exculpation) is to its credit. It has honestly faced the fact
that market share cannot be reconciled with traditional causation theory." Id.
64 Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078. The Hymowitz market share test allowed each
manufacturer to avoid liability if either its product was not marketed for pregnancy
use, or it was sold in a form unsuitable to pregnant woman. Id. at 1078 n.2.
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B. A New Due Process Test for Mass DES Torts
In Ashley, Judge Weinstein traced the evolution of the territorial nexus requirement of minimum contacts from its roots in Pennoyer to its subsumption in InternationalShoe. This linked the
examination of a defendant's "in-forum activity," or territorial
nexus, to both state sovereignty 65 and fairness analyses. 66 Eventually, however, the territorial nexus requirement was relegated
to the fairness inquiry, and state sovereignty reduced to demanding only that the defendant's acts give rise to a sufficient state
interest;67 thus, "the inquiry has shifted from a territorial to an
interest nexus analysis."68 The element of territorial minimum
contacts, which according to the court must be regarded as a "historical accident," does not fit within the context of DES litigation.69 Further, the court observed that such a test has become
outdated over time and must be modified to address mass tort
70
suits.

"Conservative[ly]" viewing precedents, Judge Weinstein set

forth a two-prong test.7 1 Under the first prong, as long as the "fo-

rum state has an appreciable interest in the litigation,... the
assertion of jurisdiction is [deemed] prima facie constitutional."72
65 See Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 583. "[It is only when a non-resident defendant's
contacts with a state reach a certain level that the state has authority to assert jurisdiction over that defendant." Id. at 579.
66 See id. at 583 (quoting InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The court stated
that InternationalShoe lightened the burdens imposed by Pennoyer, but was unable
to completely free itself from them. Id. at 582.
67 Id. at 584-85. The court stated that this independent sovereignty inquiry was
formally acknowledged in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92, but later retracted in Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03
n.10 (1982). Id. In comparison, later cases have consistently maintained that the forum's interest in litigation is a crucial component in asserting jurisdiction. See id. at
584.
68 See id.; see also Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)
(explaining that "[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the interests
of the plaintiff and the forum will justify even serious burdens placed on the alien
defendant"); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1985) (noting
state has interest related to contacts established there); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1983) (holding that plaintiffs lack of contact with forum state
not imperative where state has legitimate interest in holding defendants answerable
to claim).
69 See Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 585 (contending that initial adoption of territorial
notions of sovereignty in Pennoyer was dubious even when first enunciated).
70 Id. at 586.
71 Id. at 587.

72 Id. Under the first prong of the test, a court must determine "whether the litigation raises issues whose resolution would be affected by, or have a probable impact
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Under the second prong, the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutional unless, "given the actual circumstances of the case, the defendant is unable to mount a defense in the forum state without
suffering relatively substantial hardship."7 3 The test must be applied flexibly to the facts of the case with the assumption of fairness, unless the defendant informs the court of potential
burdens.74
IH. THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF AsHLEY
According to traditional and accepted standards, before addressing issues of substantive law, a court must initially inquire
into its power to adjudicate a case.75 It is submitted that the
Ashley court, by altering jurisdictional norms to suit DES litigation, stepped far beyond judicial constraints and produced an adhoc, jurisdictional synthesis of procedural and substantive lawan undertaking best reserved for the legislature. The judiciary
cannot adequately resolve a nationwide policy problem by merely
extending the outer bounds of personal jurisdiction,76 which will
on the vindication of policies expressed in the substantive, procedural or remedial
laws of the forum." Id. This interest test is incorporated from cases such as Keeton,
Burger King and Asahi, and includes a "proximate cause inquiry [which] impos[es]
some limitations on the causal chain between a particular litigation and the state's
interest." Id. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish an interest. Id.
73 Id. The court lists five non-inclusive considerations to determine the relative
burden imposed by the assertion of jurisdiction: (1) defendant's available assets; (2)
whether the defendant is or was engaged in substantial interstate commerce; (3)
whether the defendant is sharing the cost with an indemnitor or co-defendant; (4) the
comparative hardship incurred by defending suit in another forum; and (5) the comparative hardship to the plaintiff if the case was dismissed. Id.
74 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 589. The court stated that this analysis will, in some
regards, parallel the analysis controlling discovery under Rule 26(b)(1)(iii). Id. at
588-89.
7 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984) (stating that choice-of-law concerns should not complicate or
distort jurisdictional inquiry); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) ("The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law."); see also Bruce Posank, The Court
Doesn't Know its Asahi from its Wortman:A CriticalView of the Constitutional Constraintson Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. Rsv. 875, 877 (1990) ("The

choice of law issue generally is more important to parties and the state than the jurisdictional issue.").
76 See Roger S. Fine, A PersonalPerspectivefrom the Manufacturer,55 BRoo. L.
Rnv. 899, 903 (1989). "The 'unusual' circumstances of the DES scenario cry out for a
straight forward legislative solution...." Id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B.
Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269, 317

(1991) (noting that mass torts threaten to create "huge discrepancies in the awards
received by similarly situated plaintiffs, backlogged courts, lengthy delays in compensation of the victims, and enormous transaction costs").
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only lead to greater expense, inequities, and hardships for both
plaintiffs and defendants.7 7 The Ashley decision, while supported
by the desired objective of compensating injured plaintiffs,7 can
only be viewed as an abuse of judicial powers. 7 9
By altering jurisdictional barriers, the Ashley decision released an economic hydra into the stream of commerce. The elimination of the territorial nexus requirement between the defendant
and the forum state disregards the significance of foreseeability,
leaving interstate commerce at the mercy of a remote, unforeseeable plaintiff.80 To permit state substantive law to control jurisdictional standards subordinates the constitutional protection of
due process, as well as the traditional forum-defendant relationship,8 ' to the transient and malleable standard of the state's interest in the litigation.8 2 The result will be variable and conflicting
state jurisdictional guidelines based upon differing tort theories
that will arguably expose interstate manufacturers to inconsistent
83
and burdensome liabilities.
77 See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 76, at 317. Undoubtedly, "[tlhe end
product will... be the bankruptcy of many defendants and the depletion of available
insurance and other assets well before all claimants are compensated." Id.
78 See Fine, supra note 76, at 902 (citing compensation as human objective of
Hymowitz decision).
79 Fine, supra note 76, at 903 (asserting that creation of expansive remedies in
DES cases is responsibility of legislature only). "When a court is faced with a problem
that is a social one rather than a legal one, we defer to the legislature, which has far
more flexibility and power to mold solutions that match our problems." Id.
80 Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 111-12, 117 (1987).
The Asahi Court held that in order to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who places
a product in the stream of commerce, the Due Process Clause demands at the very
least the element of foreseeability. Id. at 117.
81 But see Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 586-87. The court explained:
Given that New York law has evolved to promote the efficient resolution of
mass DES torts, and given the problem of applying prevailing traditional
jurisdictional concepts to such cases, a modification of established standards
to determine the constitutionality ofjurisdictional statutes that incorporates
an interest nexus inquiry but not a territorialnexus inquiry is necessary in
the DES context-and perhaps in other mass tort cases.
Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
82 Id. According to Ashley, the primary requirement for a mass tort defendant
being hauled into court is the state's interest as manifested by its substantive, procedural, or remedial laws. Id. Consequently, the power vests solely in the state, and
the only remaining jurisdictional shield is the inability of that particular defendant to
mount a defense. Id.
83 See David A. Fischer, ProductsLiability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability,
34 VArD. L. Rav. 1623, 1656-58 (1981) (contending that market share liability creates
"over-deterrence" by allowing liability to exceed actual causation); Sharon Novak, Into
the Quagmire: Washington Adopts Market Share Liability in DES Cases, 21 GoNz. L.
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It is suggested that due process restrictions on personal jurisdiction must remain consistent regardless of the type of action at
issue. This can only be achieved by following the traditional interpretation of due process. This will assure a foreseeable scope of
jurisdiction for all potential defendants, uniformity in the application of substantive law, and a degree of certainty in the overall
tort system.
CONCLUSION

Over the past 115 years, personal jurisdiction has evolved due
to innovative judicial decisions modifying standards in response to
a growing nation. Historically, the defendant's conduct and relationship to the forum state have been the basis for establishing
jurisdiction. The increasing number of mass tort suits, however,
has introduced new and troubling legal questions in this area.
The solution to policy concerns posed by mass DES torts is not to
base jurisdictional standards on state substantive law. The creation of a "new" due process test grounded on state policy will inevitably lead to increased litigation and confusion in our legal
system.
In the words of Judge Weinstein, "[W]e have reached a critical
period when more stability and predictability through legislation
is desirable."8 4 The Ashley decision, however, fails to recognize
that mass torts, and DES cases in particular, present complicated
problems of national magnitude whose solutions lie far beyond the
limited power of the judiciary.
John Howard

REv. 199, 237-38 (1986) (arguing that conflicting market share analysis may lead to
double liability).
84 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 559.

